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FACT, NORM, AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW-THE CASE OF HOMOSEXUALITY
Richard Delgado*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial decisions in hotly contested, emerging areas of law often
turn on disputes over legislative facts,1 values,' and standards of re-
view.3 The many articles in this symposium illuminate these disagree-
ments as they affect homosexual rights cases. Unlike the disagreement
surrounding specific elements of fact, value, or standard of review, the
interdependences among these elements have received little scholarly
attention, but may be just as critical to judicial decision making.
Whether a fact is found to be the case may depend on the intensity
with which evidence of it is reviewed and the party assigned the burden
of proof with respect to it." These determinations may turn on other
facts,5 or may require normative judgments-which may require yet
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. J.D., University of California-
Berkeley (1974). i gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Professor Joshua
Dressier; Linda Beecher, member of the California Bar; and Richard Dennis, member of the
Texas Bar.
I. See Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980); Delgado, Active Ration-
ality in Judicial Review, 64 MINN. L. REV. 467 (1980); Freund, Review of Facts in Constitu-
tional Cases, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 47 (E. Cahn ed. 1954); Karst, Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 75; Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court,
The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61
VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975); see also Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting
the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924).
"Legislative facts," sometimes called "constitutional facts," are facts that courts are con-
cerned with in connection with a broad, lawmaking function, such as construing a statute or de-
claring legislation constitutional or unconstitutional. They are contrasted with "adjudicative
facts," which concern only the parties before the court. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRO-
cEss 384 (tent. ed. 1958); R. MiSHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 143 (1965). An exam-
ple of an adjudicative fact is a finding that a specific child was refused permission to register at a
school because of her race; of a legislative fact, that "separate but equal" schools stigmatize black
children and harm them emotionally.
2. See Delgado & McAllen, The Moralist as Expert Witness, 62 B.U.L. REv. 869 (1982);
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Moore,
The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 293-94 (1981); see also Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
3. G. GUNTHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 671-74 (10th
ed. 1980); L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1002 (1978); Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97, 101-08. The state must prove factual issues in
strict scrutiny analysis.
5. See, e.g., infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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further facts. 6 A fact or norm may enter into the analysis more than
once, 7 or may come with some degree of legislative authority.8
When, because of partiality or oversight, a judicial opinion fails to
take account of the entire matrix of fact, norm, and standard of re-
view,9 the opinion often fares badly in history's judgment. In Buck v.
Bell,10 an institutionalized, mentally retarded woman was ordered ster-
ilized after a finding that she was the daughter of a feebleminded
mother and had given birth to a daughter also diagnosed as feeble-
minded." The United States Supreme Court compared the woman's
interest in resisting sterilization to a soldier's interest in avoiding com-
bat and summarily upheld the order.1 2 The Court left unaddressed a
number of questions that are now seen as highly relevant: (i) whether
procreation, even though of lesser importance than life, is nevertheless
constitutionally protected; (ii) whether feeblemindedness, in general or
in Carrie Buck's case, is hereditary; (iii) whether, if it is hereditary, its
eradication justifies compulsory sterilization of the institutionalized;
and (iv) whether any less onerous means exist for reducing the inci-
dence of feeblemindedness in the next generation. The opinion is now
considered to be one of the least distinguished in Supreme Court his-
tory. The Court's failure to analyze fully the matrix of normative, fac-
tual, and standard-of-review questions just mentioned seems a likely
factor in its low estate. 13
Bell is not a historical anomaly; recent cases evidence similar fail-
ures of analysis. In Roe v. Wade, " several normative and legal conclu-
sions depended, as they often do, on multiple findings of legislative fact.
6. See, e.g., infra notes 79-8 1.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 105-12.
8. See generally infra notes 139-54.
9. Usually, the mind's innate logic prevents these connections from being overlooked. See N.
CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND (1972); N. CHOMSKY, SYNTAX AND STRUCTURE (1978).
10. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
11. Id. at 205. The diagnosis was made by a nurse shortly after the child's birth. It later
came to light that the petitioner was the mother of a second child, who dies of measles after
completing second grade and was reported to be a bright child. M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE,
BIOETHICS AND LAW 405 (1981).
12. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
13. Some legal realists might argue that whether a court is justified in reaching a given
conclusion is beside the point; judges decide cases not for reasons of logic, but because of con-
scious or unconscious class loyalties, biases, and political perceptions. This article is about judicial
reasoning-about ways in which opinions can be sound or unsound, convincing or unconvincing. I
do not deny that judicial sociology, the study of judges' actual behavior, is a valid enterprise, nor
that knowing a judge's social or political views may sometimes help predict the judge's decision.
But knowing that a judge will probably decide a case a certain way does not help us know whether
he or she should decide it that way-whether the decision is correct, persuasive, or sound. Nor
does it help the judge who wants to decide a case in a principled way. This article concerns
problems of the latter type.
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The Supreme Court accordingly devoted considerable attention to the
factual predicates 5 from which it drew such conclusions as that a wo-
man's interest in an abortion is fundamental;"6 that two, and only two,
countervailing interests must be accommodated;' and that these inter-
ests become compelling at the first and second trimesters of pregnancy,
respectively. 8 Despite the extensive survey of medical and psychologi-
cal fact, many found the opinion unpersuasive.' 9 A likely reason for the
failure to convince was that many of the Court's findings of legislative
fact depended on a further level of facts and normative choices that
was not fully explored.2 0
More satisfactory treatment of a web of norms, legislative facts,
and considerations affecting standard of review is found in In re Quin-
lan.2 In Quinlan, the parents of an irreversibly comatose young woman
brought suit to be appointed her guardian for the purpose of terminat-
ing medical treatment that, doctors testified, was preserving her exis-
tence. 2 Emphasizing the momentous and personal nature of the choice
15. Id. at 146-52, 162-64.
16. Id. at 153-54.
17. Id. at 162.
18. Id. at 163.
19. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup.
CT. REV. 159.
20. For example, why, normatively speaking, should a choice the frustration of which causes
specific physical, psychological, and lifestyle "detriments," be constitutionally protected by the
right of privacy, Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (psychological, economic, social, and physical detriments
imposed on a pregnant woman forced to carry an unwanted child), when other choices are not?
Nonregistration for the draft, ingestion of mind-altering drugs, and homosexual relations are
choices that the law forbids, even though the prohibition imposes costs (detriments) on the draft
resister, drug user, and homosexual. Why are only two state interests worth balancing against the
woman's right to abortion? Id. at 162-63. One interest that was mentioned briefly, and then
dismissed, is protection of the fetus as life, id. at 159, an interest that arguably could have been
compelling before viability. See Ely, supra note 19, at 933-35. The factual and normative under-
pinnings of the protectible-only-if-viable finding are not closely analyzed. Clarity on all these ques-
tions would have required more analysis than the Court offered. Without it, the opinion fails to
persuade; the result may seem right, but the method by which it is reached remains troublesome.
See generally Ely, supra note 19; Epstein, supra note 19.
That a more complete analysis is possible is shown in Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). Professor Regan details the physical and psychological burdens a
pregnant woman carrying an unwanted fetus may be forced to bear. Id. at 1579-88 (faintness,
nausea, vomiting, tiredness, insomnia, slowed reflexes, poor coordination and balance, manual
clumsiness, shortness of breath, aversion to certain foods, tender breasts, edema, urinary distur-
bances, backache, weight gain, awkward gait, varicose veins, changes in pigmentation, stretch
marks, emotional volatility, the pain of childbirth itself, and numerous postpartum complaints,
including depression). Regan then explains why these burdens are normatively significant, id. at
1588-91, and develops a theory, based on equal protection, to protect the woman's right to abort
and escape these burdens when they are unwanted. Id. at 1621-29.
21. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
22. Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655-56. Her higher brain centers were irreversibly destroyed; she
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to terminate lifesaving medical treatment,2 3 the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the parents' right to exercise that choice for their daugh-
ter."' The court supported its selection of a stringent standard of review
with factual and normative reasoning 2 5 including a comparison of ter-
mination-of-treatment decisions with decisions already included within
the right of privacy.26 The court next considered competing state inter-
ests. The most powerful competing interest, preservation of life, was
found incapable of justifying abridgement of a patient's right to termi-
nate treatment when the patient is unlikely to experience a return to
full, sentient life.
2 7
Many of the connections the Quinlan court explored among fact,
norm, and standard of review illustrate what might be called "horizon-
tal dependence"--dependence of one element on another at a given
stage of analysis. Quinlan also illustrates a second type of dependence,
"vertical dependence," in which a finding made at one stage of analysis
influences findings at a later stage. In Quinlan, the court's conclusion
that the decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment falls within the right
of privacy increased New Jersey's burden of justification for invading
that interest. Not only must any justification be substantial,28 entire
categories of justification were effectively ruled out.29
Horizontal dependence can arise at several stages of a constitu-
tional analysis: (i) determining the nature of the interest invaded;30 (ii)
assessing the seriousness of the invasion;" (iii) evaluating counter-
vailing state interests; 32 (iv) determining less onerous alternatives;
3 3
was unresponsive to stimuli and unable to communicate. Id. Her brain was not, however, com-
pletely dead. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
23. Id. at 38 & n.7, 39, 355 A.2d at 662 & n.7, 663. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 211-12
(Douglas, J., concurring) (privacy protects "the basic decisions of one's life").
24. Since Karen Ann Quinlan's wishes were impossible to ascertain, the "only practical way
to prevent destruction" of her right to terminate treatment was to permit a proxy decisionmaker
to exercise that right for her. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The parents' decision was
subject to review by a hospital ethics committee. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 667.
25. Id. at 25-26, 39-40, 355 A.2d at 655, 663-64.
26. Id. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 663.
27. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
28. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
29. Although the court does not say so, it would seem that a consequence of an activity's
falling within the right of privacy would be that most paternalistic justifications ("for his or her
own good") for interference would be ruled out. In these areas a person is assumed to know his or
her own wants and how best to satisfy them.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 85-93.
31. Minor deprivations of liberty are treated less solicitiously than drastic ones. Compare
Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 451 U.S. 904 (1981) (minor time,
place, and manner restrictions on religious fundraising in public place held permissible) with Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (ban on sale of contraceptives, punishable by prison
sentence, held unconstitutional).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 94-114.
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and (v)_ balancing state and individual interests." Vertical dependence
can arise among any two or more such stages.
The remainder of this article analyzes these interdependences in
homosexual rights cases. These cases present complex issues of fact,
value, and standard of review. My purpose is not to decide whether the
law should protect homosexuals' rights, or even whether particular leg-
islative facts are the case or normative propositions about homosexual-
ity are valid. Rather, it is the more limited purpose of identifying the
factual and normative questions which a full analysis entails and trac-
ing the logical relations among them. Homosexual rights cases are, in
some respects, like decisions respecting abortion and sterilization; they
arouse strong pro or con attitudes. When this occurs, it is easy to over-
look issues that seem obvious later. The road map, or checklist, this
article develops may help avoid oversimplifying issues that are, in real-
ity, complex.36
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF HOMOSEXUALS
A. The Controversy and Its Components
In 1974, the American Psychiatric Association voted to remove
homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.31 Since then, attitudes toward homosexuality have been in
flux. A number of municipalities and a few states have decriminalized
sodomy or enacted gay rights ordinances,3 7 but homosexuals still live
33. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99, 115-19.
35. Certainly, opinions need not address every factual, normative, or standard-of-review is-
sue that bears on the controversy. They may justifiably omit issues that are settled, obvious, or
noncontroversial. No one would condemn a court that, in a homosexual teachers' case, neglected
to consider whether homosexuals are human beings (obvious), whether the state has a legitimate
interest in assuring that public school teachers are good role models (settled), and whether a
tenured teacher has an interest in continued employment (settled). One could criticize a court that
decided such a case without examining whether homosexuality is a psychological, impairment,
whether a homosexual teacher might nevertheless serve as an adequate role model, and whether
the teacher's suit is entitled to strict or relaxed judicial review.
I also concede that there may be cases where a court must omit treatment of an element that,
while relevant to its decision, cannot be addressed without fragmenting the court and threatening
consensus. These exceptions aside, courts have a stake in providing opinions that are persuasive to
others and examples of "reasoned elaboration." See Dressier, Gay Teachers: A Disesteemed Mi-
nority in an Overly Esteemed Profession, 9 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 399 (1978).
36. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 281 (1980); N.Y. Times, April 4, 1974, at 12, col. 4 (reporting APA vote to delete
homosexuality from list of illnesses). The decision was controversial, even among psychiatrists.
Some charged that the declassification was "political"-a concession to the growing influence of
homosexuals. Id.
37. See ordinances and statutes collected in E. BOGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LISTER. J. Rup & T.
STODDARD, AN ACLU HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE apps. A & C (rev. ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as ACLU HANDBOOK]; see also Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
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under varying degrees of legal disability with respect to housing,
38 em-
ployment, 39  child custody, "°  occupational licensing,"
1  and
immigration. 2
Challenges have been brought to restrictions in all these areas, but
with little success. 43 Some courts find the state's regulatory interest
facially adequate and demand little or no justification.
4
4 Other courts
require justification, and purport to find it in some physical, psychologi-
cal, or social disability that homosexuals are thought to suffer.
45 Others
find homosexuality immoral and justify repressive legislation as a
means of reinforcing conventional values."
A few courts have begun a cautious retreat from these positions by
increasing the state's burden of justification, 47 rejecting certain justifi-
cations outright,48 or requiring individualized treatment or tightness of
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949-51 (1979).
38. ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 69-76. But see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.04, (West
Supp. 1984-85) (makes it a misdemeanor to discriminate in rental housing or public accommoda-
tions on the basis of sexual orientation); Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (Col. Super. 1982) (homosexuals are a protected class under state law prohibiting dis-
crimination in rental housing).
39. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); ACLU HANDBOOK, supra
note 37, at 16-23; Rivera, supra note 37, at 813.
40. See, e.g., In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976); ACLU
HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 94-101; Rivera, supra note 37, at 884.
41. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1969); ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 24-31; Rivera, supra note 37, at 855.
42. See, e~g., Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967). But
see Hill v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
The INS can only bar gays who have been certified by government doctors, a task the doctors
have refused to perform since 1979. San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 23, 1982, at 2A, col. 1. See
also ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 58-68.
43. See generally ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37; Rivera supra note 37. The ACLU and
Gay Rights Advocates provide legal counsel in many test cases.
44. Military and immigration cases best illustrate this "hands-off" approach. E.g.,
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Beard v. Strahr, 200 F.
Supp. 766, 773-74 (D.D.C. 1961), vacated per curiam, 370 U.S. 41 (1962) (complaint dismissed
as premature); Rivera, supra note 37, at 842-52, 934-42.
45. See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 252-55 (D.C. Cir.
1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Jane B.. 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848.
46. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af id
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); Dressier,
Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Roadblock, Civ. LIB. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 19 (crit-
icizing this view); Dressier, supra note 35, at 400-17 (chronicling societal reactions).
47. See, e.g., Norton, 417 F.2d 1161; Watkins v. United States Army, 541 F. Supp. 249
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (mem. and order granting in part and denying in part motions for summary
judgment); Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973); aFd
on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975); Morrison, I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175; People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
48. See, e.g., Morrison, I Cal. 3d at 220-30, 461 P.2d at 378-86, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 178-86
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classificatory fit.4 The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on any of
these issues; it has declined to review recent homosexual rights cases, 50
affirmed without opinion a Virginia decision upholding a sodomy stat-
ute, 51 and decided without opinion a homosexual rights case on grounds
of free speech. 52
When courts, as they must, decide such cases on their merits, they
will need to identify carefully and to make decisions on matters of fact
and values, and determine the appropriate standard of review. The fac-
tual questions at issue may include the following: whether homosexuals
are unstable, narcissistic, or violence-prone; 53 whether they are more
likely than heterosexuals to seduce the young;54 whether homosexuality
is "transmissible" from one person to another;55 whether homosexuals
are superior to the general population in such respects as artistic abil-
ity, gentleness, or empathy; 5 and whether homosexuality is an ordinary
option, like preferring chocolate to vanilla.57
(rejecting "immorality per se" as grounds for dismissal of homosexual teachers); Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53 (rejecting argument that sodomy
statute is necessary to protect the institution of marriage); Schuster v. Schuster, No. D-36867
(Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1974), affid in part en banc, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978)
(rejecting view that a homosexual parent's custody invariably harms children).
49. See Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (requiring particularized
showing of unfitness for duty in action for military discharge); Society of Individual Rights, 63
F.R.D. 399 (requiring particularized showing of unfitness for employment); Morrison, I Cal. 3d
214, 461 P.2d 375, 812 Cal. Rptr. 175 (same, in action for dismissal from public teaching posi-
tion); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 490-91, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53 (rejecting
blanket assertion that sodomy statute was necessary to protect morality).
A greater judicial emphasis on narrow classifications would be consistent with recent studies
indicating that homosexuals fall into different groups. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 195-231 (1978). See also A. KINSEY, W.
POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 (1948) (homosexual-
ity "on a continuum"); D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 85, 330 (1978) (multifactorial
view of homosexuality).
50. Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985); Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985).
51. Doe. 403 F.Supp. 1199, affd mem.. 425 U.S. 901.
52. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd
mem. by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
53. Emotional instability is a ground for excluding a person from a security clearance, em-
ployment, or immigration. See Rivera, supra note 37, at 830, 934-42.
54. Rivera, supra note 37, at 889-904. A propensity to molest or seduce the young would
argue strongly against teaching employment or child custody.
55. Rivera, supra note 37, at 855-56, 889-904. See also Board of Educ. v. Calderon, 35
Cal. App. 3d 490, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 807 (1974); Comment,
Federal Employment of Homosexuals, 19 CATH. UL. REV. 267, 268 (1969) (letter from chair of
U.S. Civil Service Commission to gay organization expressing concern over contagion and conver-
sion if government were to employ homosexuals).
56. E.g., D. WEST, supra note 49, at 317 (gays successful in arts, government, and
medicine).
57. E.g., LETTERS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1873-1939, at 4119-20 (E. Freud ed. 1960) (homo-
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Normative questions include whether homosexuality is vicious or
morally evil;58 whether it is a threat to social institutions such as the
family;59 and whether society may punish homosexuality to guard
against these dangers, and if so, how severely.
6 0 Standard of review
questions include whether homosexuals should be treated as a suspect
class"t and whether homosexual relations should be regarded as a fun-
damental interest. 2 The three types of questions are interconnected;
few are susceptible of conclusive proof. How should courts approach
the welter of overlapping issues?
B. Fact, Norm, and Standard of Review: Analytical Context
The first issue a court must determine when a homosexual chal-
lenges legislative or administrative action is whether the action burdens
him or her because of sexual preference.6
3 The answer is an adjudica-
tive fact, the disposition of which will affect primarily the parties
before the court.64
1. Standard of Review
If the challenger establishes that state action burdens him or her
because of sexual preference, the court must next select the standard of
judicial review for determining whether that burden is justified. Courts
uphold governmental action affecting ordinary economic or liberty in-
sexuality a "variation of the sexual function ... it cannot be classified as an illness"); Richards,
Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and
the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 982-83 (1979). See supra text accompanying
note 36 (American Psychiatric Ass'n declassifies homosexuality); see also C. FORD & F. BEACH,
PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 134-43, 257-59 (1951) (homosexuality occurs in animals, i.e.,
"naturally"); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, supra note 49, at 659-60. The decision to
classify behavior as "normal" or "abnormal" may, of course, be value-laden. See infra notes 84,
122-23 and accompanying text (reasons for curtailing rights of homosexuals often thinly veiled
value judgments).
58. E.g., R. ATOLLER, PERVERSION: THE EROTIC FORM OF HATRED (1975); H. CLECKLEY,
THE CARICATURE OF LOVE (1957); Socarides, Homosexuality and Medicine, 212 J. A.M.A. 1199,
1200 (1970). According to Gerald Gunther, one advantage of means-end scrutiny is that it re-
quires the legislature to spell out ill-considered or anachronistic grounds for action. Gunther,
supra note 3, at 45-46.
59. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 79-88. This threshold question is analytically straightfor-
ward: was or was not the homosexual dismissed from his or her position, threatened with criminal
prosecution, denied child custody, or otherwise disadvantaged?
64. This is not to say that the rules pertaining to standing and injury in fact are not some-
times vitally important. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). They rarely, however,
require a court to make broad findings of legislative fact.
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terests if it has any rational basis. 65 Strict review is applied when gov-
ernmental action abridges a protected liberty or classifies according to
suspect criteria.66 Some courts purport to apply sliding-scale review, in
which the state interest and means-end fit are judged according to the
relative suspectness of the class affected and the fundamentalness of
the interest invaded.6"
a. Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Class
Although no court has found homosexuals to be a suspect class,68
commentators have urged that homosexuals be declared a "quasi-sus-
pect" class entitled to an intermediate level of solicitude.69 A number
of criteria have been offered to explain what makes a class suspect or
quasi-suspect: (i) that the trait or traits defining the group are immuta-
ble;70 (ii) that the class has suffered a history of discrimination and
stigma;7 1 (iii) that the classification bears little relationship to the
members' ability to contribute to society;71 (iv) that the class is politi-
cally powerless and unable to protect its interest in legislative
marketplaces. 73
Most will agree that homosexuals have been discriminated against
historically and have little organized political power.74 Immutability
65. E.g.. Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920); Delgado, supra note I, at 467-68.
66. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1090.
67. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1190. Some favor this mode of review because its "means"
orientation is relatively deferential. See Gunther, supra note 3, at 44.
68. See Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting strict scrutiny and
appearing to apply intermediate due process scrutiny in homosexual's suit for improper military
discharge), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
69. E.g., L. TRIBE. supra note 3, at 944-45 & n.17; Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Asso-
ciation, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 648-49 (1980); Comment, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitu-
tional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L.REv. 193 (1979). See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 162-64 (1980). A "quasi-suspect" group is one that has some, but not all, of the
indicia of suspectness. See infra notes 70-73; Comment, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?
83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974); see also Belier, 632 F.2d 788.
70. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
71. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segre-
gation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426, 427 (1960).
72. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
73. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 28; Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at
152-53 n.4.
74. They would seem to fall between blacks and women with regard to stigma and political
powerlessness. It is possible that undisclosed homosexuals are more highly represented than
women at the highest reaches of government. Women have considerably more voting power, how-
ever. Cf J. ELY, supra note 69, at 163-64 (1980); Dressier, supra note 35.
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and contribution to society present closer cases. Most experts believe
that only some adult homosexuality is reversible,
75 and then, only if the
patient is highly motivated and has an experienced therapist.
7" Analyti-
cally oriented therapy seems less effective than behavior modification
and visualization therapy." Recent studies suggest that some homosex-
uality may be physically or genetically predisposed
78 and difficult to
reverse.
Pressured reversal of homosexuality also raises normative ques-
tions. Judicial protection of persons against discrimination on the basis
of color, sex, or other unalterable characteristic responds, in part, to an
intuition that it is unfair to penalize persons for what they are, rather
than what they do.1 9 If homosexuality is partly chosen (doing), partly
predetermined physically (being), courts must decide whether the non-
chosen component is great enough to warrant judicial protection. Such
an evaluation is inescapably evaluative. Similarly, normative questions
are raised if certain types of homosexuality are only reversible at great
cost to the homosexual, for example, by undergoing painful condition-
ing or drug treatment. A condition that is mutable only with drastic
treatment might well be deemed immutable because of a conviction
that no one should be forced to undergo extreme treatment to escape
the consequences of his or her makeup. Further, even assuming homo-
sexual conduct is controllable by an act of will,
80 studies show that per-
75. E.g., L. HATTERER, CHANGING HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE MALE (1970) (homosexuality
difficult to change); N.I.M.H., TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, FINAL REPORT 5 (1969)
(same); D. WEST, supra note 49, at 241-75 (same). See also M. SCHOFIELD, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 212 (1965).
76. See sources cited supra note 74.
77. D. WEST. supra note 49, at 248-64.
78. See A. BELL, M. WEINBERG & S. HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE (1981); D.
WEST, supra note 49, at 77-84 (hormonal and genetic causes of homosexuality) (citing studies).
Even Sigmund Freud, the originator of psychotherapy, reportedly believed that some female
homosexuals were physically predisposed to lesbianism. D. WEST, supra note 49, at 173. Some of
the more impressive studies indicating a physical component or predisposition for homosexuality
are the so-called "twin studies" in which the investigator locates a missing twin of an identical
pair who were, for some reason, raised independently. See, e.g., id. at 80-83. If the twins were
separated at an early age and have had no contact with each other, and if there is a very high
"concordance" rate, this is strong evidence of a genetic factor in homosexuality. Other investiga-
tors attribute cross-sex or homosexual behavior to prenatal exposure to gonadal or stress hor-
mones, barbituates, or other agents that affect the neurological development of the fetus. See 119
SCIENCE NEWS 309 (1981).
The prevailing view, however, is that in most cases, homosexuality is learned through early
childhood experiences. See, e.g., I. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF
MALE HOMOSEXUALS 310-13 (1962). Social learning theorists take a broad view, believing that
sexual orientation is molded by conditioning and reinforcement .of many types, up to and including
the age of adolescence. D. WEST, supra note 49, at 80-11i (citing authorities).
79. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 154-55.
80. This suggestion would apply, of course, only to burdens on practicing homosexuals.
[VOL. 10:3
CASE OF HOMOSEXUALITY
sons with powerful urges are incapable of forming happy, enduring
marriages with members of the opposite sex. Penalizing such an indi-
vidual for giving in to his or her urges in effect punishes him or her for
refusing to lead a life of sexual abstinence. Imposition of such a stark
choice is, at least, a close normative question.
The third criterion, contribution to society, also resists summary
analysis. Some experts believe that homosexuality indicates an underly-
ing emotional disorder cutting across major areas of a person's life81
and manifesting itself in narcissism, anxiety, impulsiveness, and a ten-
dency to form shallow attachments to friends, family, nation, and ca-
reer.82 Others find the homosexual no more neurotic or unstable than
the average person-except insofar as society's treatment makes him or
her so-and point out the many gay artists, statesmen, and persons of
business and letters who have contributed to civilization over the ages.83
Many psychological judgments about homosexuality are, in part at
least, disguised value statements, requiring evaluation as such. 4
b. Fundamental Interest
A similar complex of facts and norms arises in fundamental inter-
est analysis. Scholars and gay rights advocates have urged that consen-
sual, adult, homosexual acts be protected as an aspect of the right of
intimate association,85 sexual privacy,8 6 or respect for persons.8 7 Each
Some administrative guidelines and state statutes are so broadly drawn, however, that they have
been applied to latent homosexuals, who have a predisposition toward homosexuality but who have
not yet acted on it. Rivera, supra note 37, at 810. For these persons, homosexuality is not altera-
ble by an act of will.
81. See, e.g., 1. BIEBER, supra note 78; H. CLECKLEY, supra note 58; C. SOCARIDES, THE
OVERT HOMOSEXUAL 7 (1968); D. WEST, supra note 49, at 180, 197; Loney, An MMPI Measure
of Maladjustment in a Sample of "Normal" Homosexual Men, 27 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
486, 488 (1971); Myrick, Attitudinal Differences between Heterosexually and Homosexually Ori-
ented Males and between Covert and Overt Male Homosexuals, 83 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY
81 (1974); Saghir & Robins, Homosexuality: I. Sexual Behavior of the Female Homosexual, 20
ARCH. GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 192 (1969); Socarides, Homosexuality and Medicine, 212 J.
A.M.A. 1199, 1200 (1970).
82. See sources cited supra note 81. But see R. MITCHELL, THE HOMOSEXUAL AND THE
LAW (1969); Dean & Richardson, Analysis of MMPI Profiles of Forty College-Educated Overt
Male Homosexuals, 28 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 483 (1964) (authorities reporting little or no
psychopathology).
83. See. e.g., sources cited supra note 82. See also D. WEST, supra note 49, at 317 (many
homosexuals successful in business, government, and the arts).
84. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. See also Szasz, The Myth of Mental
Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 113 (1960) (mental disease categories operate as valuative licenses,
justifying what would otherwise constitute illegitimate interference in lives of individuals).
85. Karst, supra note 69, at 655-63.
86. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957-58 (1979). See
also Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (right of privacy extends to private
sexual conduct between consenting adults, whether husband and wife, married or unmarried,
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of these characterizations depends on normative or legislative fact. For
example, how critical is a homosexual orientation to the gay person;
how deeply ingrained is the orientation as a part of self or personal-
ity? 88 Is a same-sex coupling an intimate association, like marriage,
deserving of social protection for the community, solace, and personal
enrichment it offers,89 or a corrupt liaison like that of a band of robbers
or partners in a psychopathological relationship?9
0 Is it a shallow, im-
personal union, 9' or a long-term relationship capable of providing emo-
tional growth and nourishment? 2 Many of these normative and factual
questions are horizontally dependent. For example, a decision that
same-sex relationships are intimate associations implies a positive (or at
least neutral) attitude toward them. A decision to include them within
the right to privacy entails that they are essentially self-regarding, and
thus, entitled to noninterference unless the state can show a compelling
interest.
93
heterosexuals or homosexuals; sodomy statute declared unconstitutional), appeal dismissed, 743
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc granted, 743 F.2d 236 (Jan. 25, 1985).
87. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 994-95, 1090; Karst, supra note 69; O'Fallon,
Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19
(1979). The Supreme Court after 1971 has been less receptive than at previous times to expansion
of fundamental rights or creation of new suspect classes. Gunther, supra note 3, Under the cur-
rent restrained approach, courts de-emphasize review of the normative aspects of a legislative
choice, concentrating instead on the means by which the statute promotes a legislative end and the
closeness of means-ends fit. Id. at 33-37. This approach would tend to devalue courts' normative
functions and emphasize their legislative factfinding functions. See supra notes 1-2 and accompa-
nying text. But, it seems unlikely that courts will be able to eliminate normative scrutiny entirely,
for it will often be impossible to know whether a given statute or mechanism promotes a goal
unless one knows what is good about that goal and why it is valued. This leads inescapably back
into normative analysis. Once a court begins examination of state goals in these terms, one out-
come it may reach is that the goal or objective was overvalued, or even not good at all.
88. These are criteria for applying the right of privacy. See generally Delgado, Euthanasia
Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 474,
477 (1975); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1174
(1974).
89. See Karst, supra note 69, at 655-63.
90. The term "corrupt," of course, has a strongly normative component. For views that the
homosexual relationship is in fact inferior to most heterosexual relationships, see, e.g., C. SOCA-
RIDES, supra note 81; A. STORR. SEXUAL DEVIATION 89, 90 (1964); EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXU-
ALS AND OTHER PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1950)
(finding homosexuals masochistic, malicious, narcissistic, unreliable, and emotionally unstable).
91. See sources cited supra note 90.
92. Compare sources cited supra note 90 with A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITY:
A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978) and C. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MA-
TRIX 159 (1975). See also sources cited supra note 82.
93. Once the factual and normative predicates of a standard-of-review determination are
identified, the question arises, which party has the burden of proof regarding them. There is little
agreement on this question. See Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immatur-
ity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 5, II (1959); Delgado, supra note 1, at 476 n.44 (parallel between stan-
dards of judicial review and trial rules regarding burden of proof). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316




Once the court selects a standard of review, it will examine the
state's reason for acting as it did.94 Interlocking factual and normative
questions arise here as well. Consider a state that denies teaching em-
ployment to homosexuals on the ground that they could transmit homo-
sexual tendencies to young students.99 Before accepting this justifica-
tion, a court should subject it to empirical and normative analysis. Does
exposure to an adult role model predispose children to adopt that per-
son's sexual orientation? If so, how often does this happen? Does the
answer depend on the age of the child, or whether the teacher is an
avowed, as opposed to a "closet," homosexual? If there is such a con-
version effect, is it wholly undesirable?
Experts disagree about whether homosexuality is transmissible
from one person to another. Some believe that an individual's sexual
orientation becomes fixed in early childhood and cannot easily be
changed thereafter even through seduction by an adult.96 Seduction
may be rare; studies indicate that homosexuals are less likely than
heterosexuals to seduce or molest children.97 Proponents of a "learning
model," however, believe that any modeling by a respected adult in-
creases the likelihood that a child will become homosexual.9 8 A review-
ing court must further evaluate the professed state interest and decide
whether a child, if so affected; suffers an injury, in normative terms,
which outweighs the teacher's liberty interest and economic stake in
practicing his or her profession. Is the risk of contagion sufficient to
outweigh this burden?
Another interest used to justify laws regulating sexual conduct is
impairs reproductive rights); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (exis-
tence of facts necessary to sustain economic legislation assumed).
94. Invasion of a fundamental interest or classification according to suspect criteria requires
a compelling state interest; invasion of an interest subject to intermediate protection, or classifica-
tion according to quasi-suspect criteria, requires a substantial state interest; all other invasions
require a rational state interest. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
95. E.g., Gaylord, 88 Wash. 2d at 298-99, 559 P.2d at 1347. ACLU HANDBOOK, supra
note 37, at 21-22.
96. A. BELL, M. WEINBERG & S. HAMMERSMITH, supra note 78; 1. BIEBER, supra note 78, at
191; M. HOFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD 122-27 (1968); D. WEST, supra note 49, at 94-100, 217-18,
223-24, 239, 639; Bieber, Homosexuality, 69 AM. J. NURSING 2637, 2639 (1969) (seduction not a
significant cause of homosexuality); Money, Hampton & Hampson, An Examination of Some
Basic Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Hermaphroditism, 97 BULL. JOHNS HOPKINS HosP. 301
(1955); Socarides, supra note 81, at 1200 (before age three).
97. Such a fact may be a result of the more severe sanctions at risk to the homosexual. D.
WEST, supra note 49, at 213-14 (citing studies). See generally P. GEBHARD, W. POMEROY & C.
CHRISTENSEN, SEX OFFENDERS (1965).
98. See supra note 78.
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preservation of the family.99 Although protection of the family is un-
questionably a compelling interest,100 it is not clear that penalizing ho-
mosexuality advances that interest. If homosexuality is relatively resis-
tant to change, 101 the threat of punishment will pressure few
homosexuals to enter into heterosexual marriage.102 And, even if the
pressure were effective, the marriage might well fail. As was noted ear-
lier, when a homosexual marries a person of the opposite sex, the mar-
riage rarely succeeds. In a general sense, it may be argued that laws
which penalize homosexual conduct reinforce traditional societal val-
ues, and thus, encourage the norm of marriage and family.
10 3 The ar-
gument is plausible, but incomplete. How much reinforcement occurs,
and at what cost.104 Is a penalty necessary to avoid harming the family
99. Richards, supra note 86, at 993 (evaluating this interest in the case of homosexuality);
Note, Homosexual's Right to Marry, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 210-11 (1979) (same). See ACLU
HANDBOOK. supra note 37, at 83-84; Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1980); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifes-
tyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 595 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
101. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
102. D. WEST, supra note 49, at 241-75. See L. HATTERER, supra note 75; C. TRIPP, supra
note 92, at 251 (1975).
Further, a court might ask whether homosexuality reduces the number of heterosexual mar-
riages as much as other practices and callings that we tolerate, such as the Catholic priesthood,
Arctic exploration, and military service. Inconsistent treatment of similar obstacles to marriage
would weaken the case for antihomosexual legislation.
103. See, e:g., Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, -. , 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1974). While
the Supreme Court has not addressed the interest of the family in the homosexual rights context,
the Court has generally acknowledged the link between legislative regulation of'marriage and
protection of the family as "perhaps the most fundamental social institution in our society." Trim-
ble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977). Additionally, it has been argued that several community
values are promoted by exclusive recognition of traditional norms of marriage and kinship:
(1) stability and cultural patterns for positive childrearing; (2) continued socialization and en-
forcement of public virtue; (3) structural support for a democratic society; and (4) objective juris-
prudence to achieve generality and reliable expectations. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of
Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463, 472-91 (1983). Generalized harm to the family might provide a compelling
state interest. The Supreme Court has strongly repudiated the view that restrictive legislation is
only proper to prevent identifiable harm to individuals. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), the Court upheld the right of legislatures to act on "various unprovable assump-
tions," id. at 61, and to promulgate moral legislation to deal with a danger which "has a tendency
to injure the community as a whole." Id. at 69. For such a view with regard to restriction of
homosexuality see L. DEVLIN, supra note 46. These arguments are, however, heavily laden with
questions of legislative fact and value which must be carefully analyzed by a couri when con-
fronted with evaluating the preservation of the family as the state interest.
104. A court cannot avoid the necessity of this balancing by urging that the legislature, and
not the courts, is the proper arena for the demarcation of homosexual rights. Judicial scrutiny of
the restrictions is regulated by constitutional principles and the well-settled role of the courts. In
the area of illegitimacy, the Supreme Court has applied an intermediate level of scrutiny notwith-
standing the legislative purpose of enforcing the traditional family structure. For a review of Su-
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as an institution?
Vertical dependence also can arise at this stage. For example, an
earlier conclusion that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class
may have been based on a finding that homosexuality is unchangeable
and marked by stigma.10 5 The government could attempt to use a ver-
sion of this finding to justify denying jobs or other benefits to homosex-
uals. A school board or military discharge panel could argue, for exam-
ple, that the presence of such stigmatized individuals in their
institutions would lower morale and impair efficiency."0 6 Child welfare
authorities could refuse custody for homosexuals of their children on
the ground that community ridicule would injure the children emotion-
ally. ' 7 A factual finding that was made in connection with establishing
strict scrutiny could thus be used to defeat a claim evaluated under
that standard.
This curious give-with-one-hand, take-with-the-other result"0 8 can
be avoided by precluding use of constitutional facts established at one
level of generality to establish facts at lower levels of generality.10 9
Thus, a challenger who succeeded in showing that homosexuals in gen-
preme Court illegitimacy cases see Comment, Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children: A Con-
sistent Rule Emerges, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 142.
Neither can a court resolve issues in favor of restrictive legislation by adopting a legislative
definition of the marital relationship. Such a definition should be subjected to scrutiny in terms of
the legislative fact and norms which would support it. When a decision accepts with insufficient
analysis such a legislative definition, the opinion will fail to be persuasive. See, e.g., Baker v.
Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
105. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
106. Gaylord, 88 Wash. 2d at 297, 559 P.2d at 1345-46 (removal from teaching position);
ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 21, 32-33 (government employment). See generally Note,
Security Clearance for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403 (1973).
107. E.g., In re Jane B, 85 Misc. 2d 513, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848. See Note, The Avowed Les-
bian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge That Can No Longer
Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799 (1975).
108. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 535-36 (2d ed. 1977) ("law of the
case" doctrine, which provides that facts found during a course of litigation are regarded as
proven later during the same course of litigation).
109. An alternative approach might be to adopt a rule that no legislative fact established
for a different purpose may be used against the party who established it in the same trial or course
of litigation. Cf C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 123-24 (2d ed. 1972)
(cases denying preclusive effect to finding of fact on preliminary issue when this coincides with
central issue in case).
This rule would depart from the practice we follow with regard to adjudicative facts. Many
adjudicative facts help the party who establishes them in one way, but injure him or her in other
ways. For example, a plaintiff who proves that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of negligent
conduct may benefit from the inference that the defendant was probably responsible for the injury
on this occasion, but may also cause the jury to believe the plaintiff was also negligent in not
taking precautions to protect himself or herself, at least if he or she knew of the danger. We do
not consider this unfair; the plaintiff must make a tactical decision whether the item of evidence
will provide greater benefit than harm to him or her.
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eral are a stigmatized class could still compel the state to prove that
stigma would exist as to him or her personally, would be of a type that
the legal system should recognize, 110 and would disable him or her
from teaching or raising a child.
The same rule would operate in fundamental interest analysis.
Suppose a homosexual teacher persuades a court to apply strict scru-
tiny because, among other things, homosexual conduct is an essential
aspect of personal identity for the avowed homosexual."' Later, the
state might seek to use thatfact against the teacher, arguing that one
so constituted cannot serve as a good role model. 1 As with suspect-
class analysis, the court should permit the teacher to prove a general
proposition about personal identity while still requiring the state to
prove the disabling trait in the individual case. Perhaps the teacher will
be able to show that homosexuality, while deeply engrained, will not
become obvious to the children, or that, even if it does, he or she has
sufficient redeeming traits to tip the balance.
The same rule, of course, could be invoked by the state: Imagine a
case in which the court finds the petitioner entitled to strict judicial
scrutiny because consensual, adult, homosexual conduct falls within the
constitutional right of privacy. The defendant, a government agency
that deals with sensitive information, seeks to justify the petitioner-em-
ployee's dismissal on the ground that homosexuality exposes him or her
to the risk of blackmail.1 1 3 If the plaintiff were to argue that private
conduct cannot lead to blackmail, the argument should be rejected.
Homosexual relations may generally be private, but where even a slight
risk of exposure is unacceptable, the government should be permitted to
show that risk. Indeed, it is the clandestine nature of many homosexual
relationships that, coupled with social disapproval, makes blackmail
possible.
A second group of interests, somewhat less frequently asserted to-
day, centers around the notion that homosexuality is immoral in it-
self-that is, without regard to its biological and psychological na-
tures. " 4 In this view, homosexuality can be burdened or punished
simply because it is wrong. These morals-based interests are discussed
110. Undeserved stigma or bias should normally be ignored, as there is a less onerous means
of avoiding the harm resulting from it, namely, reeducating the public.
I ll. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92 (criteria for fundamental interests).
112. Such rationale would depend for its argumentative force on the view that homosexual-
ity is immoral per se. See Gaylord, 88 Wash. 2d at 297, 559 P.2d at 1345-46; ACLU HANDBOOK,
supra note 37, at 21-22 (discussing "role model" argument against employment of homosexual
teachers).
113. See also ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 49, 55-56; Rivera, supra note 37, at
855-56; Note, supra note 106.
114. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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in the next section.
3. Means-End Fit and Least Restrictive Alternative
a. Instrumental Justifications
If a court applying intermediate or strict scrutiny finds that the
state has a compelling interest, the court must still find that the state's
action is calculated to advance that interest and is no more onerous
than necessary. " 5 For example, a single homosexual parent faced with
loss of child custody might argue that the state has a less onerous
means of protecting the child's emotional health, namely, periodic ob-
servation by school and welfare authorities coupled with free counsel-
ing."1 6 Evaluating arguments of this type requires factual and norma-
tive scrutiny. Are surveillance and treatment, in fact, less onerous than
simple denial of custody?' 1 7 Is exposure to a homosexual parent detri-
mental to a child and, if so, how detrimental? " 8 Is it equally harmful
no matter the child's age, or is there a point beyond which exposure
ceases to be cause for concern?" 9 Many of these questions can be an-
swered only in relation to others; some resemble and are vertically de-
pendent on questions that arose at earlier stages of analysis.
b. Normative justifications
When the government is required to defend a statute, it will gener-
ally do so by showing that it is instrumentally rational-that it effi-
ciently promotes ends that society agrees are good. 120 In other cases,
however, the government will simply assert that the conduct in question
is immoral' and may be burdened as a valid exercise of its "police
115. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 722-24.
116. Termination of parental rights eliminates the constitutionally protected right to raise
and care for one's children, while the observation-and-treatment approach only inconveniences the
parent and child and costs the government money.
Least restrictive alternative considerations seemingly do not arise if two divorced biological
parents are competing for custody of a child, and one of the parents is homosexual. Both parents
assert parental rights, and any disposition will be onerous for the losing parent. In these cases, a
court should be under no obligation to determine and require the least onerous alternative.
117. The state might argue that the stress and invasion of privacy would be harmful for the
child as well as parent. The parent might counter that the state's objective cannot be achieved.
Most children maintain some contact with a noncustodial parent and will probably learn about the
parent's homosexuality. Refusing the gay parent custody or visitation rights will thus not shield
the child from the shock of realizing that the parent is a homosexual.
118. Compare In re Tammy F, 2 WOMEN'S R'rs. L. REP. 19 (Cal. App. 1974) (causes "ad-
justment problems") with Shuster v. Shuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978) (no likely emotional
harm).
119. Cf supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
120. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 451-52, 995; Delgado, supra note 1, at 467-68. But
see Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174 (1979).
121. E.g., Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Doe, 403 F. Supp. 1199;
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power" to promote the general health, safety, welfare, and morals. 22
Justifications may be normative without containing words like
"wicked," "sick," "decadent," or "immoral." Statements that homosex-
uals are unequipped to hold certain positions, cause disruption by their
very presence, or pose a threat to children contain normative compo-
nents. How should courts evaluate such justifications? The difficulty for
the challenger is that such broadly couched justifications could legiti-
mate almost every restriction on homosexual conduct.' 2 3
Imagine a competent, homosexual, public school teacher whose
discreet homosexual relationship with a consenting adult has come to
the attention of his or her school board. The board moves to discharge
the teacher under a provision permitting dismissal for conduct that is
"immoral or against community standards."' 2 The teacher will be un-
able to challenge the dismissal with instrumental justifications-that he
or she has good evaluations, teaches a critical subject, or conducts his
or her sex life with the utmost discretion. The board invokes the immo-
rality of the teacher's conduct, not its consequences. The means-end fit
is, arguably, perfect: the conduct is immoral; the regulation punishes it.
Invocation of morality should not end all analysis, however. Our
legal tradition regards morality as more than mere convention or the
will of the powerful; 25 moral mistakes are possible.1 26 Legislation that
burdens homosexuals might be mistaken in a number of ways: (i) ho-
mosexuality might not be wrong at all; (ii) it may be wrong, but repres-
sion may be an ineffective way of eliminating it; (iii) homosexuality
may be wrong, but not wrong enough to justify curtailment of personal
Wilkinson & White, supra note 99, at 591-93 (morals-based objection principal remaining
ground for laws against homosexuals). The classic treatment of the view that society may punish
homosexual acts to reinforce public morality is P. DEVLIN, supra note 46.
122. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497,
545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("society is not limited in its objects only to the physical
well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its
people as well").
123. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 839, 853; Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional
Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1981). But see Gunther, supra note 3, at 24 (amorphous goals
permissible in complex, unsettled areas). For the view that public opinion is becoming more toler-
ant of homosexuality, see Richards, supra note 57.
124. Actions to dismiss homosexual teachers are frequently brought under rules with lan-
guage similar to this. See Gaylord, 88 Wash. 2d at 296-99, 559 P.2d at 1345-47; ACLU HAND-
BOOK. supra note 37, at 21-22; Rivera, supra note 37, at 861-64, 871-74.
125. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49, 184, 207, 240 (1977); J. ELY, supra
note 69; C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES (1970); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46-53
(1971 ); Delgado & McAllen supra note 2; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Miller
& Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 691
(1960).
126. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (rectifying error of antimiscegenation stat-
utes); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
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liberty to eradicate it. "Moral due process" 117 requires that challengers
be afforded an opportunity to prove the state wrong in any of these
ways.
Challenging the state's normative premise is certainly the most
difficult of the three options. Yet, it must remain open. Laws regulating
private possession of pornography, 2 ' forbidding dissemination of con-
traceptives,1 29 prohibiting mixed-race marriages, 130 and criminalizing
religious use of peyote by American Indians1 3' have been declared un-
constitutional despite claims that they were needed to promote moral-
ity.13 2 The same may eventually occur with homosexuality.131 Moral
theorists have urged that rules be supportable with reasons; that with-
out such reasons they are indistinguishable from superstitions, quirks,
prejudices, or personal predilections of the lawmaker and are inade-
quate bases for restricting liberty in a free society.134 These reasons
127. The term is my own. It refers to the notion that before a court uses an ethical or moral
consideration against a person, the person should be given an opportunity to dispute it or any
factual premise necessary to its validity. See infra text accompanying note 166; Delgado & McAl-
len, supra note 2. The standard of review will, of course, determine the degree of difficulty a
challenger will meet in his or her task. Under the mere-rationality standard, the challenger will be
required to prove not just that homosexuality is not immoral, but that no reasonable legislature
could have thought it so. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. Under strict scrutiny, the
state should be required to prove that the dangers to public morals arising from homosexual be-
havior constitute a compelling state interest.
128. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
129. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distribution to unmarried users); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130. Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
131. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
132. See also State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (declaring unconstitutional the
state sodomy statute); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (declaring unconstitu-
tional as beyond the police power a statute that penalized oral or anal sex acts outside marriage).
133. See Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 490-91, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53 (re-
jecting protection of morality as justification for sodomy statute); Dressier, supra note 35; see also
Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for Decriminaliza-
tion of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1286 (1979). If a court finds that a normative
question is genuinely unresolvable, then it may wish to dispose of the case in a way that will
hasten the time at which normative uncertainty can be dispelled. For example, an appellate court
can require individualized treatment in the hope that case-by-case disposition will facilitate the
development, over time, of a stable moral consensus. See generally Tribe, Structural Due Process,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 305-07 (1975) (decision-making approaches should be calcu-
lated to encourage evolution of moral consensus, especially in transitional areas-homosexuality
would seem to be such an area).
134. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 996-1004
(1966). See also 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 296 (14th ed. 1980) (reasons against criminaliz-
ing homosexual conduct; it is a matter of personal choice; has no victim; laws are not enforced;
yields no deterrence; acts are done privately and cause no offense). The principal opposing
view-that social dislike for homosexuality does constitute a good reason for criminalizing it-is
argued in P. DEVLIN, supra note 46. It is difficult, however,to see how Devlin's argument could be
differentiated from a similar argument for repressing women or forbidding racial intermarriage.
Both the thought of a woman holding a "man's" job and the thought of a white woman and a
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may be empirical, or may take the form of deduction from a higher
norm. When a homosexual challenges a normative rule justified by an
asserted empirical fact, the court may review the fact in the usual man-
ner. 135 Where the justification for a normative statement ("homosexu-
ality is wicked") is a broader normative statement ("sex without the
possibility of reproduction is a corruption of its original, purpose;
human faculties should be confined to their original purposes"), the
broader statement may be reviewed under accepted criteria of moral
discourse-universalizability, impartiality, consistency with other val-
ues that we hold.136 A challenger should also be able to argue that even
if homosexuality is undesirable, repressing it is inappropriate. This
might be the case if, for example, it appeared that homosexuality is
physically caused, not particularly harmful, and beyond a person's
power of choice,1 37 or if the costs of enforcement were excessive.138
III. NONJUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL OR NORMATIVE
ISSUES
A final group of issues arise if a party calls to a court's attention
that a fact, norm, or standard of review has been established by an-
other branch of government, such as an administrative agency, or the
surgeon general. 139 Unless there is a reason to distrust the process by
which the agency arrived at a factual finding, a court should ordinarily
accept it at face value. 40 Much of the scientific case concerning homo-
sexuality is complex and divided."" So long as this is true there is little
reason to assume that courts are more likely to be accurate fact finders
than other bodies. But where the class affected is a suspect or quasi-
suspect class, or the interest invaded by the legislation is fundamental,
courts should, and do, reexamine fact-findings for verity and plausibil-
black man living together as man and wife arouse disgust and revulsion in the minds of some.
Devlin argues that society needs to reinforce some such emotions to solidify social consensus. But
we have rejected certain consensuses, including the two mentioned above. Devlin's book offers
little guidance for determining when a social consensus is worthy or unworthy and thus is of little
assistance in deciding whether or not society may punish homosexuality for moral reasons.
135. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
136. These are the most commonly accepted criteria of moral discourse. E.g., Delgado &
McAllen, supra note 2; Richards, supra note 62, at 987-99.
137. See supra notes 79-81.
138. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 45, 52, 67-68 (1963).
139. E.g., EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. Doc.
No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) (finding homosexuals masochistic, malicious, narcissis-
tic, unreliable, and emotionally unstable); N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1979, at 20, col. I (surgeon
general found homosexuality not a mental disease for purposes of immigration laws).
140. G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 863. See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U:S. 144, 152-54 (1938); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1263-81 (1972).
141. See supra notes 45-114 and accompanying text.
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ity. 42 As courts begin close examination of laws pertaining to homosex-
ual behavior, it seems probable that legislative and administrative fact-
findings, like those discussed in section I, will come under increasing
scrutiny.
A closer case arises if a legislature purports to make a normative
finding in support of a statute. For example, in enacting the Natural
Death Act, 143 the California legislature declared that failure to provide
a method by which irreversibly ill patients may discontinue life support
violates their privacy and dignity.14 These are debatable normative
findings.1 45 Is a California court free to find otherwise-that continua-
tion of life support does not erode human values, but strengthens them?
With respect to homosexuality, suppose a legislature finds the practice
to be unnatural and debasing-is a court free to disregard this if it
believes homosexuality to be natural and ethically neutral?
A case can be made for holding legislative findings on normative
questions conclusive. Legislatures, after all, are supposed to know the
people and their preferences in matters of morals and opinion. But, the
people may be morally wrong; recall slavery and witch-burning. 46 If
moral error were remediable only through formation of a new social
consensus and never through judicial action, it might remain forever
uncorrected. Judicial repudiation of a legislative value judgment is,
however, a harsher form of rejection than that of a legislative fact; it
may be expected to occur less frequently.1 47
A final problem arises if the legislature attempts to designate the
standard of judicial review to be applied to a controversy. A state legis-
lature might find that homosexuality is nonfundamental and that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, and
order courts to review state action affecting homosexuality under the
rational basis standard.4 8 Conversely, a legislature might declare that
adult consensual sex is a fundamental right which is not to be abridged
without a compelling state interest. 49 How much weight, if any, should
142. See supra notes47-49 and accompanying text. See also M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE,
supra note 11, at 300-09.
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1985).
144. Id. § 7186.
145. See M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 11.
146. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a statute that re-
flected social stereotype of women's role); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Congress
has power to find that literacy test violates equal protection clause).
147. Although less frequent, judicial repudiation of legislative values will still occur. See
cases cited supra notes 128-32, 146.
148. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 455 U.S. 904 (1982) (upholding California initiative
directing that California courts analyze school busing cases under federal "intent" standard).
149. Cf. ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 17, 109 (gay rights ordinances and states
that have decriminalized adult, consensual sex); Rivera, supra note 37, at 948-50 (passage of gay
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courts give such directives?
The Supreme Court has resisted legislative attempts to limit courts
by dictating what evidence is relevant1 50 or by enacting presumptions
that place matters beyond proof or disproof.151 It is likely that the
Court would take an equally dim view of legislative directives to use a
less strict mode of review than it would otherwise employ. 152 Legislative
specification of a strict standard of review is less troublesome, as the
cost of the resulting leniency is borne by the state.153 To return to an
earlier example, the California Natural Death Act specifies that the
right to discontinue life-saving medical treatment is "fundamental."' 54
If this right comes into conflict with other rights and interests, it seems
highly likely that California courts will defer to the legislative charac-
terization. No statutory designation of an activity as "fundamental"
seems ever to have been overturned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional cases, particularly those of first impression, may re-
quire a court to make findings of legislative fact, decide normative
questions, and select a standard of judicial review. Factual and norma-
tive decision making is often interwoven; even selection of a standard of
review requires factual and normative decisions. Elements considered
at one stage of analysis may reappear later, at the same or different
rights ordinances; repeal of antihomosexual laws).
150. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 40-41 (discussing cases).
151. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidated statu-
tory presumption that every teacher who is four or five months pregnant is physically incapable of
teaching); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (cannot deny a married student who applies as a
nonresident to a state university the opportunity to prove a change in residency in order to obtain
in-state rates for tuition); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (cannot presume an unmarried
father to be an unsuitable parent); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (criminal statutory
presumption is invalid unless the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact). But see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (Congress may withdraw Su-
preme Court's power to hear appeals from denials of petitions for habeas corpus).
152. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982).
To permit a State to employ the phrase "within its jurisdiction" in order to identify sub-
classes of persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction . ..would undermine
the principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated. . . .The
Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-
based and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is fundamentally at odds with
the power the State asserts here ....
Id.
153. Cf. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (Congress may provide protection of Spanish-speaking per-
son's right to vote that goes beyond protection required by equal protection clause).
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1985). "The Legislature finds that
adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to . . .their own medi-
cal care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in in-




Our consideration of homosexuality illustrated all of these princi-
ples. Designation of a model of judicial review requires that the court
commit itself to a view of homosexuality and the part it plays in the life
of the homosexual. Assessment of state interests requires further con-
sideration of the nature of homosexuality, including whether it is a dis-
ease, whether it is transmissible from one person to another, and
whether it is morally wicked. Means-end analysis entails interest bal-
ancing, in the course of which further facts about homosexual conduct
may become vital.
Tracing these connections helps to insure a type of substantive
completeness in adjudication. 55 However, there are lessons to be
gained with respect to process as well. As was seen, many of the ques-
tions that arise at early stages of constitutional adjudication are gen-
eral."'6 At later stages, the level of particularity increases until, at trial,
the court will mainly be concerned with adjudicative facts, facts that
affect the parties immediately before the court, and particularized
norms. This progression from general to specific suggests a caution.
The broad early findings a court makes are important for many persons
not before the court. They determine whether entire categories of cases
will be difficult, or easy, to prove or defend. Fairness dictates that these
determinations be made openly, carefully, and with opportunity for
participation by persons and groups likely to be affected. At a mini-
mum, opportunities for intervention and submission of amicus briefs
should be made liberally available.
Just as it protects the many from the one, a court should protect
the one from the many, protecting individual litigants from generaliza-
tions drawn from the experience of large numbers of persons like
them.157 This may entail confining the effect of early findings so as not
to unduly influence more particularized findings required later.' 58 At
the final stages of review, when a court balances in an individualized
way the interests of state and citizen and explores alternative means of
advancing these interests, a court may relax its vigilance somewhat and
shift responsibility for arguing norms, facts, and policies to the partici-
155. A court may, of course, choose to obscure the basis of its decision in order to deflect
criticism it thinks would follow if the grounds of decision were analyzed openly and distinctly.
Whether this tactic is ever justified, and if so, when, is treated elsewhere. See generally Delgado
& McAllen, supra note 2.
156. See supra notes 65-93 and accompanying text (nature of class as suspect or quasi-
suspect and nature of interest invaded as fundamental or nonfundamental); supra notes 94-102
and accompanying text (nature of state interest as compelling or noncompelling).
157. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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pants themselves, as is the case with other functions in a system of
adversary justice.
